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The main aim of this paper is to give a justification of what is called the principle of comprehension. A troublesome fact concerning this principle is that the simple formulation of it leads us to a contradiction. In order to avoid such circumstances, the doctrine of size limitation was introduced. Thus the so-called operation of separation today enjoys the status of axiom which the principle of comprehension enjoyed at the time of the birth of set theory. Since we think that such logical inconveniences arouse because of the incorrect formulation of this principle on the logical system which lacks the ability to express the logical struc ture of natural language in a proper way, we shall show what the correct formulation of the principle of comprehension must be with respect to the logical system which expresses the logical structure of natural language, without taking any recourse to the limitation of size doctrine. We shall be concerned with a logical system in which the correct formulation of the principle of comprehension is a provable formula. We shall show that the axiom of separation and that of replacement are derivable in that system. For this purpose we shall put forward a logical system which captures the logical features of natural language by extending appropriately the usual first-order predicate calculus which is today on the market (we shall hereafter refer to it as LI) with some appropriate logico-linguistic devices.
We shall show that the axiom of separation and that of replacement are equivalent to each other in the system in question. They are tightly related to each other due to the comprehension principle correctly formulated. This might be a queer fact to those who are working on the standard set theory (cum LI), for it is considered usually that the axiom of replacement is stronger than that of separation. This phenomen in set theory is essentially related the axiom of power-set which is by nature of generative character. Our system has no operations of generative character, and this is the reason why the two axioms are equivalent in the system in question. There is one more formula which is equivalent to these axioms, i.e. a weak version of the correctly formulated principle of comprehension. As for the * Tokyo Institute of Technology, Oo-okayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 152, Japan.
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In the usual explanation of the axiom of separation, the notion of the limitation of size in made use of. Why was it necessary to introduce the notion of size limitation of sets? It is of course to eschew anitionomies such as Russell's. Our strategy is essentially different from this standard one. The reason for such antin omies should be looked for in the unnoticed mixture of syntax and semantics of LI on which set theory is based. LI has a hidden semantics concerning the expression of the expressions of the semantic category of names. So we shall put forward another way of solution concerning the problematic points as to the principle of comprehension. An usual explanations for the need of the doctrine of limitation of size runs as follows:
The axiom of comprehension turned out to be iconsistent and therefore cannot be used as an axiom of set theory. However, since this axiom is so close to our intiuitive concept of set we shall try to retain a considerable number of instance of this axiom... Our guiding principle, for the system ZF, will be to admit only those instances of the axiom schema of comprehension which assert the existence of the sets which are not too "big" compared to sets which we already have. We shall call this principle as the limitation of size doctrine.5 Usually the expressions of the category of names are supposed to designate individ ual objects, i.e. a name stands for an ojects and the domain of quantifiers constitutes of individuals. But this is a matter which belongs to semantics, and semantics and syntax are, from a purely theoretical point of view, two completely different notions. As a consequence, it should be strongly maintained that LI which is essentially a purely syntactic system, i.e. a purely mechanical symbol manipulation system presupposes some specific semantics as to names. LI is indeed a sytem in which to be is to be the value of a variable6 is the case. As a sequal to this hidden presupposed semantics, we have no logical device to express that something is an 5 Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, Levy [1973] , 32. 6 Cf . Quine [1948] , Gochet [1984] .
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2) The axiom of separation is not an axiom proper to set theory. 3) The notion of limitation of size is indifferent to the naturalness of this axiom.
To express this in a shaper form, it could be expressed as follows:
Claim 2: the doctrine of limitatiton of size does not justify the the axiom of sparation. Theorem 6: LI+-version of the (weak) comprehension lemma implies the axiom of replacement.
That this result was obtained within LI+ shows the axiom of replacement is not proper to set theory, either. It is by nature of everyday logical character. Its naturalness is implicitly already, though hidden, present in our everyday logical apparatus. Now a little careful examination of the proof steps T20-T24 makes us realize that to get T24, it is sufficient to use the weak comprehension lemma instead of the comprehension lemma. From this fact we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 7: LI+-version of the axiom of replacement is deducible from the weak comprehension lemma.
Combining the theorems, we get an interesting fact:
Theorem 8: The weak comprehension lemma, the separation lemma and the axiom of replacement are equivalent in LI+.
Proof: Evident from Theorems 4, 5, 7.
